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Abstract
In this paper, I evaluate Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution to the Bayesian problem of old
evidence by applying it to an early stage in the development of quantum theory. I argue that
this case study suggests that whether old evidence is anomalous or not affects its support
for a hypothesis. I introduce and defend two formal assumptions to accommodate this
idea. This analysis not only explicates an important historical example, but it also shows
that the given solution captures the intuitive importance of “surprising” evidence that has
previously been problematic in the context of old evidence.
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1 Introduction
The problem of old evidence (POE) in Bayesian epistemology has been discussed extensively,
and it is generally understood that there are several issues that might bear this name.1 In this
paper, I will be concerned with the following type of situation. Consider the time shortly after a
new theory has been formulated. We restrict our attention to a hypothesis H in that theory and
assume other information is contained in background B. Imagine that it is discovered that a
previously known fact E can be accounted for in some way by H , where E was not used in the
formulation of the theory. This newly discovered relation seems intuitively to contribute to the
support for the theory. However, some have argued that in a Bayesian epistemological frame-
work, it is difficult to account for why this should be, thus giving rise to the aforementioned
POE. There have been several approaches to the solution of this problem, including (Garber
1983), (Eells 1990), and more recently, (Hartmann and Fitelson 2015).
Hartmann & Fitelson call their solution a “more general and explanatory Bayesian ap-
proach” to POE (2015, 712). They present four formal conditions that, when satisfied, yield
the result that learning about a relation between a newly developed theory and a previously
observed phenomenon can raise one’s credence in that theory. While the four conditions are
meant to be intuitively plausible, it is left an open question whether it can be appropriately
applied to any genuine scientific cases. However, if the goal of Bayesian approaches to phi-
losophy of science is to reflect inferences made in scientific reasoning, I would argue that it is
important that a proposed solution to POE be able to accurately explicate at least one known
historical case of old evidence. In general, discussions rooted in scientific cases help to demon-
strate the significance of Bayesian epistemology beyond its role as a purely logical exercise.
While this latter is indisputably important, we can gain understanding of the domain of appli-
cation of formal analyses when new developments in the framework are anchored in historical
or contemporary scientific practice. Indeed, such case studies can contribute to both the de-
scriptive and normative aspects of Bayesian approaches. It is clear that an accurate historical
explication will contribute to the idea that this solution is genuinely descriptive, which is what
Hartmann & Fitelson seem to have in mind in their discussion. Of course, there also exists a
potential normative element. A previously successful case of reasoning that conforms to the
Bayesian analysis gives us some reason to think that this analysis could be applicable in other
contexts.
In this paper, I provide an evaluation of Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution by investigating its
ability to explicate examples of old evidence in the early stages of the development of quan-
tum theory. More specifically, I consider how a postulate about the discrete nature of energy,
i.e. a quantum postulate, was used to account for the previously known results of several ex-
periments. I begin by showing how this might have worked in Einstein’s explanation of the
specific heat of diamond, and Bohr’s old quantum theory with respect to Balmer’s formula for
1For instance, see (Garber 1983), (Jeffrey 1983), (Christensen 1999).
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the spectrum of hydrogen. This discussion shows that Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution provides
an appropriate framework for the explication of these cases of old evidence in the sense that
the four formal conditions they present are satisfied.
The application of a quantum postulate in these domains is then contrasted with Einstein’s
use of light quanta to explain Stokes’s rule in order to highlight the significance of the fact that
a phenomenon being explained is anomalous, where this indicates that the phenomenon seems
to be in direct conflict with dominant theories. I argue that an explication of old evidence that
aims to accurately formalize a reasonable agent’s thought processes should reflect this fact. The
framework of the solution, as it stands, does not fully account for the cases in question. That is,
the consideration of the historical facts necessitates the introduction of further assumptions to
accurately capture the situation. I thus propose and defend an addition to the given framework
in the form of two new formal assumptions, which I claim overcomes the identified shortcom-
ings such that their addition results in an appropriate explication of the support provided to the
quantum postulate.
This analysis yields some interesting results. First, it provides an explicit demonstration
that Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution can explicate some genuine cases of old evidence. Second,
it shows how we can capture an intuitive result from Bayesian confirmation theory that is
difficult to account for in the case of old evidence. Specifically, we see in detail how the more
surprising of two consequences of a hypothesis may better support that hypothesis, even when
an agent’s credence in both those consequences is equal to one. Thus, we are able to give a
descriptive account of this feature, where we need not abstract from an agent’s actual state of
knowledge about how likely a piece of evidence is to conclude that a surprising prediction is
more confirmatory.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly describe the POE
and Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution. Section 3 provides an overview of two of the historical
phenomena in question, and shows how they conform to the framework of the given solution.
In section 4, I present an example that has some contrasting elements with the previous two
cases. I thus discuss the implications of this case in section 5. Specifically, I propose two
further restrictions on an agent’s credences in cases where old evidence is operative, then I
show how these additions allow us to see the relation between old evidence and the value of
surprising evidence.
2 Old Evidence
In formulating the POE, we consider the impact of evidence E on hypothesis H in terms of
the simple conditionalization rule. Thus, upon learning a piece of evidence E, an agent’s de-
gree of belief in H should be revised according to the conditionalization formula, Pr(H|E) =
[Pr(H) · Pr(E|H)]/Pr(E), where all quantities are understood to be conditional on back-
ground information B. The problem is that for any evidence E that is already known, both
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Pr(E) and Pr(E|H) have the value 1 due to the fact that evidence E is absorbed into the
background B term implicitly present in both values. Thus, Pr(H|E) has the same value as
Pr(H), and so it seems that any fact that is already known at the time that we are consider-
ing a new hypothesis H cannot raise our credence in H . Yet, both intuitively and historically,
it seems that such old evidence can provide support for a new hypothesis. Classic examples
include the increased confidence in Einstein’s theory of general relativity due to its explana-
tion of the previously known precession of Mercury’s perihelion, and the support provided to
Newton’s argument for universal gravitation from previous observation of Kepler’s laws. In
both these cases, despite the fact that the evidence statements were known before the time that
the theories were formulated, we tend to think these evidence statements should raise one’s
credence in the theories, represented symbolically by Pr(H|E&B) > Pr(H|B).
There have been several suggested solutions to the problem. One class, demonstrated by
(Howson 1991), eliminates E from the background information so that probabilities P (H) and
P (H|E) are relativized to knowledge B − {E}. However, another class of solutions accepts
that E is included in B. In this case, the problem is rooted in the assumption that an agent is
perfectly logically omniscient and is thus aware of the relations between H and E as soon as
a theory which contains H is formulated. If that is so, there is no new fact about the relation
between E and H that can change the agent’s credence in H . Thus, (Garber 1983), among
others, discusses solutions that eliminate the assumption of logical omniscience on the grounds
that it is an unrealistic representation of any agent’s degrees of belief. This type of solution is
now often referred to as a Garber-style solution to POE, and it is the strategy employed by
Hartmann and Fitelson (2015).
Their solution relies on the claim that what is learned by an agent is that some relation ob-
tains between a hypothesis H and evidence E, perhaps a logical one. It is the discovery of this
fact that provides support to the hypothesis.2 Hartmann & Fitelson show that the satisfaction
of four formal conditions yields the result that learning that H accounts for E contributes to
the support for H .
Take statements X and Y , which have to do with whether a hypothesis H adequately ac-
counts for the evidence in question.3 X is the statement that hypothesis H adequately explains
or accounts for evidence E. Y is the statement that H’s best competitor (H ′) adequately ex-
plains or accounts for evidence E. The solution requires four ordinal assumptions for the
support to go through:
1. Pr(H|X&¬Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&¬Y )
2. Pr(H|X&¬Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&Y )
2Hartmann & Fitelson discuss their solution in terms of the confirmation of a theory T rather than a hypothesis.
Since I am interested in the role of the quantum postulate specifically, I take it to be the hypothesis whose support
is in question, and other assumptions to be included in the background information.
3The notion “accounts for” is deliberately vague: according to Hartmann & Fitelson, it can be satisfied by
relations such as logical entailment and explanation, among other possibilities.
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3. Pr(H|X&Y ) > Pr(H|¬X&Y )
4. Pr(H|X&Y ) ≥ Pr(H|¬X&¬Y )
I will not explicate these in detail here as their interpretation in specific contexts will be the
focus of later sections. The idea that these assumptions are intuitively plausible is defended in
the original paper. For now, we can note that each of them requires a certain ordinal ranking
of an agent’s credence in hypothesis H that depends on the various possibilities of H and H ′
accounting for evidence E. For instance, the first condition can be understood as saying that in
a case where H’s best competitor does not account for E but H does, one should have higher
credence in H than the case where neither H nor its best competitor account for E.
The proof proceeds by noting that these ordinal assumptions lead to the result that Pr(H|X) >
Pr(H). To see this, define the following probabilities in this way: a = Pr(H|X&¬Y ), b =
Pr(H|X&Y ), c = Pr(H|¬X&¬Y ), d = Pr(H|¬X&Y ). Also, let x = Pr(¬Y |X), y =
Pr(¬Y |¬X). The ordinal assumptions above can then be written as follows:
1. a > c
2. a > d
3. b > d
4. b ≥ c.
As a result of these inequalities,
ax+ b(1− x) > cy + d(1− y). (1)
This in turn entails that Pr(H|X) > Pr(H), i.e. that learning X should raise an agent’s
degree of belief in hypothesis H .
3 Old Evidence in Quantum Theory
As mentioned previously, my goal is to evaluate Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution by assessing
its ability to explicate a historical example of old evidence. In what follows, I consider how
invoking a “quantum postulate” about the discretization of certain quantities made it possible
to account for experimental results that previously had no explanation. The postulate I propose
can be stated as follows: “There is a universal, nonzero parameter h with the dimension of
action (energy · time) that can be used to impose a quantization condition on quantities that
were previously considered to be continuous.” This postulate is a way of expressing the idea
of discretization of energy that was first suggested by Planck in 1900 to explain the emission
spectrum of blackbody radiation.
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3.1 Specific heat of diamond
At the beginning of the twentieth century, a problem with specific heats loomed over parts of
the scientific community. The specific heat of a substance is the amount of heat required to
raise the temperature of a unit mass of that substance by one degree Kelvin. Lord Kelvin, in a
lecture to the Royal Society in 1900 described this problem as a “cloud which has obscured the
brilliance of the molecular theory of heat and light during the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-
tury,” (William Thomson 1901, 527). Despite many successes of the atomic-molecular theory
of gases, the combination of this conception of matter with the Maxwell-Boltzmann doctrine of
the equipartition of energy demanded by classical physics yielded mixed results in the predic-
tion of specific heats of various substances. Its application in the Dulong-Petit law successfully
predicted the specific heats of certain crystalline structures at high temperatures, but the same
law yielded values that were significantly higher than those observed for substances such as
diamond at room temperature.4 Thus, the observation in question here is the low value for the
specific heat of diamond at room temperature.
Before 1906, no one had considered the idea that quantum concepts should be incorporated
into an analysis of specific heats, or that Planck’s work on blackbody radiation could be relevant
for these phenomena. Yet, Einstein motivated his treatment of diamond by arguing that if
Planck’s quantum postulate from blackbody radiation goes to the “root of the matter,” then we
might well expect other anomalous phenomena in the context of heat and radiation, and that
such anomalies could potentially be addressed by similar quantum postulates (Einstein 1989,
219).
Einstein proposed that the idea of quantization by way of the parameter h be applied to the
energy of atoms of solids. He thus required that the energy of an atom oscillating at frequency
ν take on values infinitesimally close to the discrete values nhν, where n = 0, 1, 2 . . .. Using
this conjecture in combination with a canonical distribution to describe a system, he calculated
the mean energy of an oscillator with frequency ν. By making the simplifying assumption that
all the atomic vibrations were independent and of the same frequency ν, Einstein was able to
calculate the average energy of one oscillator (Einstein 1907, 186). The energy of one mole of
such a solid would be
E = 3R
hν/k
e
hν
kT − 1
, (2)
and the specific heat can be calculated by differentiating the energy with respect to temper-
ature.
4The Dulong-Petit law provided the molar specific heat capacity of a substance as a constant with units
Joules/Kelvin. This constant is now expressed as 3R, where R is the universal gas constant. We now know
that these divergences between predictions and observations occur because of quantum effects at relatively low
temperatures: broadly, some degrees of freedom require a certain minimum temperature before they are activated
and can store energy.
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Note that as kT/hν approaches zero, hν/kT grows large, and the expression for E ap-
proaches zero as well. In the limit as kT/hν goes to 1 and larger, the expression takes the
value of 3R. As Klein explains, “If the specific heat is plotted as a function of temperature,
or rather of (Tk/hν), one obtains a curve that rises smoothly and monotonically from zero at
the origin and approaches the equipartition value, 3R, asymptotically, when (Tk/hν) becomes
large” (Klein 1965, 176).
This relation predicts that the specific heats of solids that conform reasonably well to Ein-
stein’s assumptions should be very low at low temperatures, and will approach the value pre-
dicted by classical theories at much higher temperatures. The contradictions between the ex-
perimental observations and theoretical predictions based on equipartition occurred primarily
among lighter atoms, which could be expected to vibrate at higher frequencies, i.e. higher
values of ν, at which the value of E approaches 0. Einstein’s quantized treatment thus fits
well with these observations since they would be expected not to conform to the equipartition
predictions, but to be much lower. In particular, according to the equipartition theorem and
the Dulong-Petit law, the molar specific heat of diamond would be 3R. However, the observed
value is approximately 0.735R. With their relatively low atomic weights, atoms of carbon could
be expected to have a higher oscillation frequency according to Einstein’s assumptions, and
thus a lower specific heat than the value predicted by the Dulong-Petit law.
We can see how Einstein’s analysis was able to turn the specific heat of diamond at room
temperature into ‘old evidence’ for the quantum postulate. Before this account, there was no
explanation for the observed value of this quantity. The quantum postulate put forth above
served as Einstein’s starting point. The hypothesis that there was some discretization condition
on the energy of the molecules allowed him to describe the specific heats of certain solids in
general. The previously observed low value of the specific heat of diamond was then accounted
for by this description.
3.2 Balmer’s formula
The second instance of old evidence I will be considering is the expression of Balmer’s for-
mula for the spectrum of hydrogen, and its account in terms of Bohr’s old quantum theory as
presented in (Bohr 1913). The primary goal of this work was to provide a preliminary theory of
the structure of the atom. The assumption Bohr uses in his model of the hydrogen atom takes
the fundamental idea of quantization directly from Planck’s work on radiation phenomena,
but with a significantly different interpretation. He shows how the application of assumptions
found in Planck’s theory of radiation to ideas on the atomic structure of hydrogen results in an
account of how electrons might be bound to a positive nucleus in stable states. He considers
the behaviour of energy in the context of an atomic system, and describes the emission process
as taking place in quantized amounts, dependent on the parameter h. Using this conjecture
along with his elementary atomic model, Bohr was able to account for the Balmer formula,
which described the discrete spectral lines observed when hydrogen gas is heated. Our focus
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here will be on this latter fact.
The Balmer formula can be expressed in a generalized form known as the Rydberg formula,
ν = R
(
1
τ 22
− 1
τ 21
)
(3)
whereR is Rydberg’s constant, and τ1 and τ2 are integers greater than or equal to 1 such that
τ1 < τ2. These precise spectral lines could not be explained on the classical theory. Indeed,
one might say they were doubly anomalous. One would first expect, according to classical
electromagnetic theory, that an electron orbiting a nucleus would emit energy proportional
to its rotational frequency, and that this frequency would change continuously as the energy
is emitted, thus yielding energy of a continuous spectrum. Yet, the emitted radiation was of
an integral number of specific frequencies, as manifested in a number of discrete lines on
the spectrum. Furthermore, even if one were to accept the existence of stable states in the
atom corresponding to these discrete spectral lines, classical physics predicts that the lines of
the higher harmonics should be sums of the fundamental frequencies, whereas the observed
spectral lines were expressed by Ritz in his ‘combination principle’ as differences between the
harmonics (Jammer 1966, 69). This made Bohr’s accomplishment even more significant.
Although Balmer’s formula had been identified as accurately describing the observed spec-
tral lines, there was no theoretical account of how and why these lines were produced until
Bohr put forth his model of the hydrogen atom. On this model, electrons moved in stationary
orbits that were determined in part by the parameter h. Upon transition from one energy level
to another, an electron would emit a discrete amount of energy, hν. Bohr considered the case of
a hydrogen atom, which was generally accepted as a system in which a single electron rotated
around a positive nucleus of charge e. According to his earlier calculations, the binding of an
electron to a positive nucleus in a transition to that stable state would result in certain amount
of emitted energy.
To express the amount of energy emitted by the system when transitioning from a state τ1
to another state τ2, we have
Wτ2 −Wτ1 =
2pi2me4
h2
·
(
1
τ 22
− 1
τ 21
)
. (4)
where m and e are the mass and charge of an electron. By comparing with Equation 3 we
see that this is simply an expression of the formula put forth by Balmer, where R is replaced
by more specific constants.
Thus, we see that Bohr was able to use a quantum postulate to construct an atomic model
that was able to account for a previously observed phenomenon.5 By using a quantum postulate
5Here, I take it that Bohr did not construct his quantum theory with the Balmer formula in mind, in the sense
that this observation does not seem to be used directly to determine the equations describing the atomic system.
Instead, he justifies and explains his assumptions in terms of the need to define stable states for an atom of
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to formulate a model of the hydrogen atom, and then using this model to calculate correct
values for the previously observed spectral lines of hydrogen that had no explanation, Bohr
turned those observations into ‘old evidence’ for the quantum postulate.
3.3 Bayesian analysis
Although the conditions given by Hartmann & Fitelson listed above are meant to be plausible
enough to apply in any case, it is useful to consider what they mean in our particular context.
We have seen that the conditions are all based on comparative probabilities of a hypothesis H ,
conditional on various combinations of ways that a phenomenon might be accounted for by H
or by its best alternative H ′. Thus, in this context, we should read H , X and Y as expressing
claims about the quantum postulate in relation to the phenomena of specific heat of diamond
or Balmer’s formula. Specifically, X and Y are the following. X: “QP adequately explains (or
accounts for) E, the measured specific heat of diamond near room temperature.” Y: “Classical
physics, with its assumption of continuity for the quantities in question, adequately explains
(or accounts for) E, the measured specific heat of diamond.” While I conduct my analysis in
terms of specific heats, the same points apply, mutatis mutandis, to the account of Balmer’s
formula by Bohr’s old quantum theory.
Recall that Hartmann & Fitelson’s result requires the acceptance of four conditions, as
outlined in section 2. In our case, the first condition, which can be written Pr(QP |X&¬Y ) >
Pr(QP |¬X&¬Y ), states that the quantum postulate is more likely if it is able to account
for the specific heat of diamond and classical physics is not, than if neither it nor classical
physics with its assumption of continuity could account for this phenomenon. Historically, it
was this ability to explain the phenomenon that rendered it a promising postulate for many
scientists, so the ordinal ranking is reasonable. The second condition says that QP is more
likely if it accounts for the specific heat of diamond while classical theory does not, as opposed
to a situation where classical theory could account for it and a quantum postulate could not.
This reflects the idea that if classical theory could account for the specific heat values and QP
could not, there would have been no reason to think of QP as being promising in relation to
this phenomenon. Indeed, this condition was expressly satisfied historically, since it did indeed
seem that classical physics could not account for the specific heat of diamond, while a quantum
postulate could.
The third condition says that QP is less likely in the case that only classical theory could
explain the specific heat than in the case where both QP and classical theory are possible
explanations of the specific heat. This seems reasonable, since even if classical theory were
also able to account for the specific heat, the ability of QP to do so as well seems like it would
hydrogen, and the justification of these assumptions is that they yield values that correspond to independently
calculated linear dimensions of the atom, and ionization-potentials. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for this
point.
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render QP more promising than if it could not. One might claim that if classical theory could
account for the specific heat of diamond, then scientists would not have been concerned with a
quantum postulate in this context at all. While this may very well be true, this condition simply
ranks credence in the quantum postulate as being higher if it accounts for the specific heat than
if it does not; the actual values may well be very low. The last condition states that QP is at
least as likely if both it and its competitor explain the specific heat than if no theory at all does
so. Again, this seems reasonable: imagine that at the same time that QP was shown to be able
to account for the specific heat, a plausible way of adjusting classical theories to account for the
phenomenon was also suggested. One might not think that QP is extremely likely in this case,
but its ability to account for the phenomenon should not make it less likely than previously.
Given these assumptions, Hartmann & Fitelson show that Pr(QP |X) > Pr(QP ). This
means that, if one were to learn that QP accounts for the specific heat of diamond, then this
raises one’s degree of belief in QP. Similarly, learning that QP accounts for Balmer’s formula
raises one’s degree of belief in QP. This particular solution is fitting for a historical reconstruc-
tion for other reasons. The first is the use of a quite general idea that a theory “accounts for”
a phenomenon. Hartmann & Fitelson purposely allow for an open interpretation as to what
this means, which makes it particularly suitable for an explication of the role of the quantum
postulate. Interpretations of what QP actually represented physically were quite varied, but this
fact is not a problem in this framework. The second reason is the contention that what is being
learned that contributes to the support for QP is the fact that it accounts for a phenomenon that
was previously known. This certainly tracks what scientists seemed to be motivated by histori-
cally, since the interest always arose in response to a demonstration that the quantum postulate
could account for the phenomena. We thus see how Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution provides
an accurate description of historical results for these phenomena.
4 A contrast case
In Section 3, I discussed two examples in which a quantum postulate was used to account for
experimental results that were known prior to the application of that postulate and indeed, prior
to the first articulation of the postulate. In both cases, the fact that the phenomena were expli-
cable in terms of the quantum postulate seemed to provide that postulate with some support.
That is, the fact that one could apply a discretization condition to certain quantities in these two
contexts and thus account for previously unexplained phenomena, seemed to make the general
strategy of using the parameter h to discretize quantities in different contexts more plausible.
This can be inferred by noting that the quantum postulate was pursued further in the two cases
treated. For instance, Nernst reported on his improved experiments on the specific heat of
diamond (see Nernst 1910), citing Einstein’s explanation of the anomalous observations, and
published an article “On the theory of specific heat and the application of the theory of energy
quanta to physical-chemical problems in general” (1911), in which he used the idea of quanta
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to guide general elements of his research. The striking though limited success of Bohr’s old
quantum theory led to the more than decade-long pursuit of a better theory of the atom that
incorporated a quantization condition.
However, we can contrast these with another case of explanation of a previously known
phenomenon, namely, Einstein’s use of a quantum postulate to explain Stokes’s rule (Einstein
1905), which was an experimentally well-confirmed result dating back to 1852. This explana-
tion also arose in a context where a theory was put forth based on a quantum postulate, namely,
Einstein’s light quanta theory. Although inspired by a quantum postulate, Einstein argues for
the hypothesis of light quanta based solely on an analogy between the entropy of a system of
radiation and that in a gaseous system. The bulk of the paper is devoted to the foregoing anal-
ysis. However, using this light quanta postulate, Einstein was then able to provide an account
of three previously observed phenomena, including Stokes’s rule.
Einstein considered observations of photoluminescence, where monochromatic light is
changed to light of a different frequency when being absorbed and re-emitted by various forms
of matter. He assumed that the original and the changed light consist of energy quanta of size
hν, and that one incoming light quantum was responsible for one outgoing light quantum. By
conservation of energy, he reasoned that the final energy of a light quantum would have to be
less than that of an initial light quantum or, symbolically, R
kN
hν2 ≤ RkN hν1. This is simply an
expression of Stokes’s rule that incorporates Planck’s constant.
Despite the fact that Einstein’s explanation of Stokes’s rule provided an account of a phe-
nomenon that was previously known, scientists did not react with any great enthusiasm. There
was little to no uptake of the idea of light quanta that Einstein had introduced. One might argue
that this is simply because most found the idea of light quanta too radical, and that such a hy-
pothesis would need far more direct experimental evidence in order to be seriously considered
by many people. Yet, it is worth considering why this was such a contrast to the reception of
Einstein’s quantum postulate as applied to specific heats. Even though early applications of the
postulate to specific heats could not be tested in experimentally precise ways, it was received
as an extremely promising explanation of the phenomenon in question and triggered several
rounds of new experiments almost immediately.
Based on these reactions, it seems that this was because the use of a quantum postulate
provided an account of phenomena that were not only previously known and inexplicable by
other means, but that indeed seemed to be in direct conflict with the dominant theories of the
time. Such a feature makes the need for an account of the phenomenon much more urgent, and
I claim this was an operative feature of the cases of specific heats and spectral lines discussed
above. This can be contrasted with the case of Stokes’s rule: while it is true that at the time
of Einstein’s 1905 paper this rule was not explicable in terms of classical theories of light and
energy, it was not the case that the results were widely recognised as being an insurmountable
challenge for those theories. Instead, it seemed reasonable that one would be able to develop an
account of this phenomenon in the classical framework by taking into account some previously
unknown special conditions. Thus, any potential changes could be seen more as amendments
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to classical theory, rather than an outright upheaval. It is also worth noting that in all three
examples I have discussed, the old evidence in question can be considered instances of “novel
confirmation” in the sense that the theories incorporating a quantum postulate did not try to
accommodate the phenomena in the development process. The issue is thus whether an account
of how old evidence supports a hypothesis can plausibly accommodate this apparent difference,
where accounting for strongly anomalous phenomena seems to provide better support for a
hypothesis than accounting for one that is not viewed as anomalous.
5 Implications
In section 3.3 I considered this case study only in terms explicitly presented by Hartmann &
Fitelson. However, we can extend the analysis to shed further light on the significance of old
evidence, as well as its relations with other features of Bayesian epistemology. I will present
two features that emerge from historical considerations, namely the role of a surprising appli-
cation of a hypothesis, and the role of anomalous evidence. I will show that taking these into
account in our explication reveals relations to the feature of surprising evidence in Bayesian
confirmation.
5.1 Surprising Application
First, consider the difference between Pr(QP |X) and Pr(QP ), which can be written as fol-
lows:
Pr(QP |X)− Pr(QP ) = Pr(¬X)[Pr(QP |X)− Pr(QP |¬X)]. (5)
Let us suppose that the conditional probabilities for QP on X and ¬X are fixed, regardless
of the value of Pr(X). That is, we suppose that regardless of how likely we think it is that the
quantum postulate accounts for the specific heat of diamond, the fact of its accounting for this
phenomenon has a fixed relation with our credence in the postulate itself. Then the amount
to which one’s degree of belief in QP is raised is proportional to Pr(¬X). In other words,
it is a decreasing function of Pr(X), one’s prior belief that the hypothesis accounts for the
phenomenon. This means that if prior to learning definitely that QP accounts for the specific
heat, one already thought that this was likely to be the case, then learning this fact does not add
as much to the support for QP as if one were more skeptical of the idea that QP could account
for this phenomenon.
In our particular case, it does seem as though it would be relatively surprising that QP
was able to account for the specific heat of diamond. This is, in part, due to the fact that the
QP itself was not obviously reconcilable with certain successful aspects of classical physics.
What made it even more surprising was its application to a context that seemed unrelated to
any of the contexts in which QP was previously successful, i.e. to a theory of energy in solids
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rather than the context of energy transmission between radiation and matter. Thus, it seems
reasonable that Einstein’s demonstration that a quantum postulate could account for aspects of
the specific heat of diamond played a significant role in raising scientists’ degree of belief in
this hypothesis, given its very surprising nature. It is worth noting here that this is different
from the idea of the evidence itself being surprising : what is in question is not the result itself,
but the ability of a particular (quantum) hypothesis to account for the evidence in question.
5.2 Anomalous Evidence
I now turn to the significance of anomalous phenomena I discussed in the previous section.
While Hartmann & Fitelson do not discuss this issue, I drew attention to the fact that histori-
cally, it seems that learning that a hypothesis accounts for a previously known phenomenon is
not always taken to be strong evidence for that hypothesis. The cases where we put the most
weight on old evidence are those where it was believed that this evidence was not accounted
for by any previous theory. In the classic example of general relativity being able to account
for the precession of the perihelion of Mercury, it was intuitively seen as highly significant that
Einstein’s theory could account for this phenomenon, whereas being able to account for the
observations that Newton’s theory also covered would be merely expected of any competing
theory. In the cases of both specific heats of diamond at room temperature and the spectral lines
expressed by Balmer’s formula, it seemed significant that classical theory yielded predictions
that were in direct conflict with observations of these phenomena.
I take it that this fact can serve as a guide to conditions that a solution to old evidence should
satisfy. We can express this as the condition that an agent’s credence in a hypothesis should be
boosted the most in cases where it can account for a phenomenon that previous theories could
not account for. In other words, the support for H (or in our case QP) should vary with an
agent’s credence in Pr(Y ), i.e. how likely we think that the classical theory can account for
the phenomena in question. If we examine Hartmann & Fitelson’s framework, we can infer
that such a correlation holds in the case where two separate conditions are satisfied: first, the
relation a− c > b− d holds, and second, Pr(Y ) and Pr(X) are independent. When the latter
condition holds, Pr(¬Y |X) = Pr(¬Y |¬X), so that x = y. When this is true, we see that
Equation 1 becomes ax+ b(1− x) > cx+ d(1− x). If the first condition holds, the difference
between the two sides of the equation varies with x, as desired. I argue that these conditions are
satisfied in cases we would intuitively consider accounting for old evidence to have contributed
to an agent’s credence in a hypothesis.
First consider the assumption that Pr(Y ) and Pr(X) are independent. Pr(Y ) refers to the
credence an agent has in the proposition that classical theory accounts for the specific heat of
diamond at room temperature, while Pr(X) is the credence an agent has in the proposition that
a quantum postulate accounts for the specific heat of diamond at room temperature. Before the
quantum postulate was ever applied to this phenomenon, it was known that classical theory
could not account for the specific heat, and so Pr(Y ) was very low. The subsequent use of the
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quantum postulate had no bearing on this fact. Thus, it is reasonable to think that at least in
this case, these two probabilities are independent. Similarly, in the case of Balmer’s formula,
Bohr’s introduction of old quantum theory to provide an account of this formula did not change
a low credence in the proposition that classical theory could account for these spectral lines.
One might be concerned about this condition since the relations between Pr(X) and Pr(Y )
are features of the probability space. Thus, there is perhaps simply a fact of the matter that a
low credence in Y would affect the credence in X , and so we cannot assume independence.
However, in the situation we are considering, we have explicitly eliminated the assumption of
logical omniscience of the agent. This means that we can assign values to Pr(X) and Pr(Y )
that make sense for an agent in that context, and at the time point that we are considering, it is
reasonable to consider the two credences as being independent. After all, even if it was known
that the classical theories did not account for the phenomena, the quantum postulate modifies a
very specific aspect of classical theories. Presumably, there are countless other ways to modify
classical theory that would result in hypotheses that would not account for the specific heat. Of
course, this independence condition will not always hold: for instance, after the formulation
of Bohr’s correspondence rule, the ability of QP to account for phenomena in certain domains
would be known to depend on the ability of certain classical descriptions of phenomena. Such
relations would have to be evaluated with the individual cases in mind.
Now consider the condition that a − c > b − d. This is the same as a condition that
a−b > c−d. The difference a−b is the difference between Pr(H|X&¬Y ) and Pr(H|X&Y ).
The difference between c−d is the difference between Pr(H|¬X&¬Y ) and Pr(H|¬X&Y ). I
claim that it is reasonable to expect the first probability difference to be larger than the second.
This is because in the first case, we are assuming that H accounts for a phenomenon, and
the difference relies on whether there is another hypothesis that does the same. In the second
case, we are evaluating the probability of a hypothesis conditional on the fact that the hypoth-
esis does not account for the phenomenon in question. I would argue that the presence of an
alternative explanation is more meaningful in the first case. In the first case, when a hypothesis
accounts for evidence, a reasonable thing to ask is whether there are alternative explanations
for the phenomenon. In our particular example, this expresses the idea that the quantum pos-
tulate’s ability to account for the specific heat of diamond when classical theory could not was
significant. However, if a hypothesis does not account for the evidence in question, the latter
fact seems to be less important, in the sense that our credence in H was likely to be lower in
the first place.
Imagine for instance that we are assigning a credence to the old quantum theory, conditional
on the fact that it does not account for the observation of certain spectral lines, such as those
of helium. This failure to account for a given phenomenon seems to render our credence in
that postulate quite low. This is still true when the best possible competitor to H also fails to
explain the phenomenon. Imagine now that a theory is developed that could account for the
spectral lines. It is true that this might lower our credence in old quantum theory even more, but
given the latter’s failure to account for the phenomenon in which we were originally interested,
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there is less of a margin by which Pr(H) may be reduced. In our particular case, credence in
a quantum postulate that did not explain the specific heat would be low, regardless of whether
classical theory could account for specific heat or not. Therefore, we would expect that the
difference between c and d is smaller than the difference between a and b.
When the two above conditions are satisfied, the difference between Pr(H|X) and Pr(H)
will vary with Pr(¬Y ). Particular numbers will depend of course on the priors an agent assigns
to all the conditional probabilities. However, this dependence captures the fact that account-
ing for something like specific heat, where Pr(¬Y ) is very high, will provide relatively more
support for QP than accounting for a phenomenon like Stokes’s rule, where Pr(¬Y ) is consid-
erably lower.
5.3 Discussion
Of course, the formal conditions that I have introduced may not always be satisfied in historical
cases of old evidence. For instance, it might be the case that an agent knows the precise ways
in which Pr(Y ) and Pr(X) are probabilistically related, and so independence between those
will not hold. This would simply mean that the feature I identify here does not play a role in the
explication of the support of old evidence. Furthermore, this is not to claim that a phenomenon
such as Stokes’s rule does not provide any support at all to the quantum postulate, but merely
to claim that the support is less in comparison to the other phenomena.
Finally, we can see the significance of these results for Bayesian approaches in general due
to an important reflection of a feature that is a standard result of Bayesian confirmation theory.
We know that if evidence E is a logical consequence of hypothesis H , the support E provides
to H is higher when it is more surprising or unexpected (i.e. when Pr(E) is lower). Thus, if
one were to analyse the logical relations between the examples given here, one could say that
the evidential result of the low specific heat of diamond better confirms the quantum postulate
than Stokes’s rule because we should assign a lower prior to this evidential result that seems to
conflict with classical theory. Consequently, we need not appeal to old evidence or anomalous
phenomena at all to explain this difference.6 However, I would argue that this result actually
bolsters the importance of the analysis given here, in the following sense.
Note that Hartmann & Fitelson’s solution to POE aims essentially to provide an accurate
description of how old evidence for a hypothesis can affect an agent’s credence in that hy-
pothesis. By introducing extrasystematic statements such as X and Y , Hartmann & Fitelson
explicitly consider an agent’s credal state at a time when they are learning something about
the relation between a theory and previously known observations because the logical relations
that exist between theory and evidence were not accessible before this point. However, it is
desirable that a descriptive account of an agent’s reasoning at this point correspond to results
in Bayesian confirmation that match with our methodological intuitions. What I have shown
6I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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is that the framework Hartmann & Fitelson give for explicating the role of old evidence when
Pr(E) = 1 corresponds to the intuitively plausible result of a purely logical analysis of the
relations between the hypothesis and evidential phenomena. Given that the historical case I
have presented is exactly one in which Pr(E) = 1 for each of the phenomena in question, this
analysis provides an account of how scientists may have made the judgments they did in a way
that corresponds to the logical relation.
6 Conclusion
I have investigated Hartmann & Fitelson’s suggested solution to the problem of old evidence
and whether it can explicate at least one important episode in the history of science, namely, the
ability of the quantum postulate to account for several previously unexplained phenomena in
the early developmental stages of quantum theory. I claimed that while their solution provides
a good starting framework, an analysis of the historical facts compels us to introduce two
new formal assumptions, namely that a − c > b − d holds, and that Pr(Y ) and Pr(X) are
independent. Doing so enables the solution to differentiate between cases of old evidence with
varying levels of support, depending on how anomalous the phenomenon in question is. I
have argued for the idea that those assumptions are reasonable in the context under discussion.
This analysis yielded an important conclusion: the given framework explicates the role of old
evidence in a way that corresponds to the generally accepted Bayesian result that an unexpected
consequence of a theory better supports that theory than a less surprising consequence. We
thus see that not only can the given solution genuinely explicate an important example of old
evidence in science, but that it can also explicate a desirable feature of Bayesian confirmation
that has previously been problematic in that context.
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